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ABSTRACT
Flexible electricity networks continuously coordinate and optimize
operations through ICT systems. An overlay data grid conveys
information about the state of the electricity grid, including the
real-time status of demand and production. Data is thus the basis for
decisions that affect electricity costs and availability of assets. It is
crucial that these decisions are formed and monitored according to
a well-defined governance model. No such data governance model
exists today. In this paper, we focus on data governance in virtual
power plants. We define the problem, insisting on the issues linked
to the inherent asymmetry of this system. We propose unioniza-
tion as a framing device to reason about these issues. The central
contribution of this paper is a set of principles for a unionized data
governance model for virtual power plants.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we explore some of the issues around governance
of the data that flows from individuals to aggregator within a Vir-
tual Power Plant (VPP). This data is both extremely personal and
valuable [5, 8]. Due to the power asymmetry between individual
user and service provider, users have limited ways to influence how
their data is used.
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Figure 1: VPP structure. The aggregator controls a portfolio
of assets and participates in the energy market or provides
flexibility services.
The category "virtual power plant" is not completely defined [1],
and can assume many different organizational shapes. The subset
of VPPs of interest here are those in which the Distributed Energy
Resources (DERs), or assets, are owned by individuals outside the
organization that owns the aggregator.
While a VPP conceptually includes all the stakeholders, we are
particularly interested in the relationship between the asset-owners
and the aggregator. An asset-owner is a stakeholder that owns an
individual asset in the portfolio of the aggregator. An example is
a homeowner with a heat pump, electric car or domestic battery
that can be remotely controlled. The aggregator is the stakeholder
controlling the ICT system that collects data and controls the assets
[2]. The relationship between asset, aggregator and VPP is shown
in Figure 1.
2 ASYMMETRICAL DATA FLOWS
We can distinguish between two discrete types of data flows: The
core flows, data which flows from the assets to the aggregator, and
the supplementary flows, which are data from external sources (see
Figure 2a). The core flows represent the relationship between an
organization (the aggregator) and an individual (the asset-owner),
a one-to-many relationship. Each of the core flows are in practice
interchangeable. The supplementary flows are the basis of the
direction of the VPP, carrying the outside parameters that are used
when optimizing for system goals. They are one-to-one relation-
ships between two organizations, and typically not interchangeable
or expendable.
The nature of these data flows creates an asymmetrical power re-
lation between the aggregator and the asset-owner. The aggregator



























(b) Unionized data flows
Figure 2: Data flow models. The upper part represents the
assets in the aggregators portfolio, while the lower part rep-
resents the data sources on which the aggregator bases its
decisions.
has control over the electricity cost and availability for the asset-
owners and access to valuable and personal data about them. This
perceived loss of control can lead to digital resignation [4], which
is an issue when the aggregator and asset-owners have conflicting
goals. An example of conflicting goals is the discrepancy between
maximizing profits and preserving the integrity of the personal
sphere of the asset-owners. Allowing an organization to monitor
and control the daily lives of users demands a high degree of trust
[7]. Either through earned trust in the organization [9], or though
a trust-worthy regulation structure. It is the latter we explore here.
3 THE UNIONIZATION FRAME
Inspired by trade unions and the field of industrial relations [10], we
employ unionization as a method to restore symmetry in this power
relation. The core data flows of a VPP can be seen as analogous
to the relations of industrial employment, where the production
is contingent on the pooling of a significant amount of labor. For
the employer each worker is interchangeable, resulting in an asym-
metrical power relationship between worker and employer. Trade
unions mediate the flow of labor from workers to employer, and
through this mediation gain leverage when negotiating wages and
conditions. This is what is known as collective bargaining. Should
the employer refuse to meet the demands of the trade union rep-
resenting the workers, they can invoke a strike, removing the em-
ployers access to labor and thereby halting production.
In a more general sense, unions can be seen as aggregators of
power. Whether in relation to labour, consumer rights, student
conditions, or a host of other domains, the fundamental concept
remains: By organizing, the interchangeability and replaceability
of the individual relation is countered by collective action. We
propose the creation of a new institutional actor - the data union,
which individual asset owners can join. The data union has clearly
articulated and defined goals and mediates on behalf of the asset
owners, controlling all (or a significant amount of) the core data
flows. This allows for collective bargaining, by using the possibility
of halting or limiting the core flow (a "strike") as leverage. The
structure of unionized data flows is shown in Figure 2b.
4 GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
Based on the unionization frame and the data governance frame-
work proposed in [6] we derive the following principles for union-
ized data governance.
Unionization of Data Subjects The basis for these data gov-
ernance principles is the constitution of a data union that
mediates the goals of the asset-owners. The asset-owners
should be able to bargain collectively about the conditions
and purposes of the data flows. This includes which supple-
mentary data flows to include and how to utilize them.
Data Principles and Representation The decision domain
of data principles is concernedwith "clarifying the role of data
as an asset" [6]. The asset-owners should be represented in
a central organizational governing body, which is in charge
of defining and overseeing the data principles.
Disruptive Measures for Asserting Power The asset-owners
should be able to limit or halt core data flow, disrupting the
operation of the VPP. These measures are intended as a last
resort, but their existence is crucial to assert power and sym-
metry in the relation with the aggregator.
Accountability Needs Transparency As the aggregator is
responsible for the majority of the data collection, storage,
processing, and usage, transparency measures should be put
in place to ensure the asset-owners ability to audit the data
usage performed by the aggregator, in order to detect misuse
and assign accountability
5 FURTHERWORK
Designing usage interfaces, digital organizational platforms, au-
tomatic disruption methods, and experimentally comparing per-
formance of (non-)unionized systems are all interesting avenues
for further work. A longer version of this paper is available on
arXiv.org [3].
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